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Introduction 
 
Since the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, there has been a prevalence of 
negative attitudes to the abstract idea and to concrete particular instances of tradition.  
The social sciences typify a tendency to disparage or else to neglect tradition, as Edward 
Shils has noted (1981: 7; also Giddens 1999: 2).  It is ironical that ‘tradition’ is a coinage 
of modernity, ‘a product of the last 200 years in Europe,’ Giddens (1999: 2) pointing out 
that ‘in mediaeval times there was no generic notion of tradition’ for the simple reason 
that ‘there was no call for such a word …because tradition and custom were everywhere.’ 
 
The term tradition is often interchanged with that of transmission, as for example when 
Shils (1981: 12) writes that tradition in its basic sense refers to ‘anything [traditum] 
which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the present.’  Again, ‘the decisive 
criterion is that, having been created through human actions, through thought and 
imagination’ an object ‘is handed down from one generation to the next.’  Elsewhere, 
Shils (1981: 15) specifies that there must be ‘two transmissions over three generations’ 
before an object can be accurately described as a tradition (or the content of a tradition). 
 
There is a problem with the notion of tradition such as one finds it presented by Shils, a 
problem on which Max Radin (1937: 62) put his finger when he wrote that ‘If the term 
tradition were understood in its literal sense of transmission, all elements of social life 
would be traditional, except’ for a handful of ‘novelties …and …immediate borrowings.’  
The inclusiveness of Shils’ category of tradition is evident when he lists among its 
instances (Shils 1981: 12) ‘material objects, beliefs about all sorts of things, images of 
persons and events, practices and institutions’ as well as ‘buildings, monuments, 
landscapes, sculptures, paintings, books, tools, machines.’  All, indeed, that Shils’ 
conception of tradition (1981: 12) excludes are the relatively few things that have been 
lately created along with those phenomena that are entirely due to ‘physical processes in 
the external world …[and] of ecological and physiological necessity.’  Shils’ class of 
traditional social and cultural objects is heavily populated.      
 
One can infer that the literal conception of tradition is unlikely to be of much use in 
inquiry, and that a notion of tradition, to be serviceable, needs to be delimited to a 
subset(s) of transmitted social and cultural products.  How is the delimitation to be 
effected?  
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Narrowing the subject 
 
The problem I am posing might be dismissed as spurious by supporters of the theory of 
contemporary society as detraditionalized (Beck 1992: 153; Giddens 1994).  Writes 
Giddens (1999: 4):  ‘under the impact of globalisation’ Western societies are being 
‘opened up from the hold of tradition’ while other societies ‘that remained more 
traditional are becoming detraditionalised.’  Otherwise, as I see it, there are two main 
ways in which sociologists might approach the problem to which I have drawn attention 
so as to make the subject of tradition more amenable to investigation.  Radin ignores the 
literal sense of tradition and defines the word more narrowly. Shils does not meet the 
problem head-on but assumes that certain traditions are socially more important and more 
deserving of sociological study than are others. 
 
According to Radin (1937: 62), ‘only some of the inherited or transmitted customs, 
institutions, speech, dress, laws, songs and tales are traditions’.  (As further examples of 
tradition Radin cites (1937: 64) art techniques, costumery, gestures, cuisines, 
understandings of history and ideas of human traits as underlying national unity and 
nationalism, systems of ideas, religious doctrines, institutions.)  Radin suggests (1937: 
66) that a transmitted social or cultural object is only a tradition when it is actively taken 
up as for example in a process of deliberate imitation (in contrast to being passively 
received through inertia or superstitious fear), and when – motivating such active 
adoption - the content of the tradition is judged as valuable.  (A distinction that is not 
dissimilar to Radin’s is drawn by Oakeshott (1991: 15) between imparting/acquiring (of 
‘practical knowledge’ which he characterizes as unformulated, existing only in the 
practice of traditions, and as acquired ‘by apprenticeship to a master’) and 
teaching/learning (of ‘technical knowledge’ which is explicit and only able to ‘be learned 
from a book) as two main types of transmission.)  There are customs, for example, that 
Radin (1937: 62, 66) sees as satisfying neither part of his criterion, persisting inertially 
(being assimilated and then enacted unthinkingly).  (Radin’s implication that certain 
customs may be traditions would be disputed by a Giddens (1999: 3; Hobsbawm 1984: 2) 
who describes custom as the ‘more diffuse cousin’ of tradition.  For Giddens, ‘ritual and 
repetition’ form ‘the key defining feature of tradition’ and he regards traditions as group 
properties.  In Giddens’ view (1999: 3) the distinctiveness of tradition consists in the fact 
‘that it defines a kind of truth,’ the follower of ‘a traditional practice’ not having to 
inquire as to alternatives, tradition providing her with ‘a framework for action that can go 
largely unquestioned.’)  Radin (1937: 63) lays particular emphasis on the valuation 
criterion of traditions:  ‘Strictly and properly speaking therefore, a tradition is not a mere 
observed fact like an existing custom, nor a story that exhausts its significance in being 
told; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment.  A certain way of acting is regarded 
as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable.  The maintenance of the 
tradition is the assertion of this judgment’, the judgment forming a spring of, and being 
embodied in, conduct.  In essence a tradition is a transmitted judgment that some social 
object is possessed of value (Radin 1937: 64).    
 
Radin (1937: 63 emphasis added) considers the world’s major religions to exemplify an 
important type of tradition, consisting in highly valued transmissions (a concrete divinely 
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authored ‘sacred scripture’ and doctrinal accretions) that are handed ‘over for safe 
keeping as a deposit’ to an exclusive sacerdotal group.  The traditional element is handed 
to a particular person or to an exclusive group that has been carefully chosen as ‘worthy 
of confidence’.  In traditions of this type – further examples as cited by Radin (1937: 63, 
64) include ‘the legal aspects of the Roman law depositum’ and the ‘standards of correct 
speech’ among certain language groups - the recipient is under a moral obligation to 
preserve the deposit in an unaltered state.  
 
The proposition being contended for in the present paper is that tradition is an unhelpfully 
vague notion when, as in the writings of a Shils, it is taken to include virtually all social 
and cultural transmissions.  We contend here that the class of transmissions is broader 
than is that of traditions, having traditions as a subtype.  Another distinction that tends to 
be collapsed in the literature is that between traditions and the traditional:  objects 
described as traditional – societies, organizations, freedoms, constraints, thought, laws, 
societies, manners, customs, approaches to design (gardens, buildings), cures for disease, 
‘traditional narratives’ as discussed by post-modernists (Rosenau 1992: 85) – are not of 
themselves traditions.  By way of illustration, a person might adopt a traditional design 
for her garden after studying sketches in old books.  The design has been neglected for 
centuries.  The design is, in this instance, traditional but there is no tradition of such 
design.  Similarly there are numerous cases in the history of science of traditional ideas 
that have been long neglected being taken up and inspiring new research (Feyerabend 
1978: 101-105).  Again, the repeated selling and buying of an antique object over many 
generations can be counted as a form of transmission of a traditional object, but the 
transmission-and-object do not themselves constitute a tradition.  Monuments and 
buildings typically persist over generations, but that is not to say they satisfy Radin’s 
criterion of a tradition which includes the idea of active adoption, for buildings may 
consist as part of a taken-for-granted fabric of society.  The class of traditions (complexes 
of mutually interacting vocabularies, doctrines, practices, rules, values) overlaps that of 
traditional objects (historical objects), but it is important that the distinction be respected 
as a condition of thinking clearly about tradition.  
 
Radin’s account of tradition is unsatisfactory on at least two counts.  First, Radin’s 
paradigms of tradition – static religious traditions – are not characteristic of secularized 
modernity whose traditions are as a rule dynamic.  Second, Radin is mistaken in 
suggesting that the distinction between active acceptance and passive reception is a part 
of the grounds on which to draw the tradition/non-tradition distinction.  Traditions may 
(and perhaps invariably do) involve both these modes of transmission:  inculcation and 
learning by rote on the one hand and imitation and other forms of active learning on the 
other.  The processes are complementary:  a good many commentators might associate 
textbooks with the inculcation and passive reception of a body of knowledge, but it is 
found on close examination (as for example by Kuhn (1977: 306-307)) that textbook 
exercises call for intelligent participation (problem solving).  Oral traditions, Micronesian 
navigational knowledge being a case in point, may appear to be transmissions involving 
passive reception, the function of transmission being to preserve a complex system of 
knowledge on which the lives of mariners and island communities depend.  
Anthropologists, however, have shown that in the oral transmission of Micronesian 
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navigational knowledge recitation and rote combine with active analysis and problem 
solving (Worsley 1997: 134, 142).  The assimilation of religious traditions by children 
from an early age may require that they actively understand ideas and imitate practices, 
but it just as surely requires that they passively learn texts by rote which, of course, is 
why rationalists criticize religious teaching as dogmatic. 
 
Science 
 
Traditional objects are not ipso facto traditions. Traditions may involve passive reception 
as well as active imitation.  The relative proportions of the passive and the active are 
likely to vary between traditions. 
 
Science deserves our attention as a (the?) major tradition of modernity.  It is a tradition 
about which, as a matter of interest, supporters of the detraditionalization thesis have said 
very little (there is mention of it on only 5 of the more than 300 pages of Heelas, et al., 
1996).  The following discussion draws from the writings of Michael Polanyi who 
appears to have been the first scholar to recognize that tradition is an essential part of 
science, and who almost certainly was the first scholar to systematically analyze the 
content and function of the tradition of science.   
 
Polanyi draws a sharp distinction between the acquisition of scientific knowledge up to 
the completion of the undergraduate degree and the training that PhD students receive for 
research.  For Polanyi there are transmissions of cultural products (theories and other 
forms of substantive knowledge, vocabulary, knowledge of how to use instruments, and 
models, methods and understandings such as enable students to solve textbook-problems 
(Kuhn’s paradigms-as-exemplars)).  The other main type of transmission that Polanyi 
identifies in science consists in fostered abilities and skills for generating new products 
(insights as to which problems are live, where to look for discoveries, whether to 
disregard experimental anomalies).  Polanyi suggests that generative transmissions from 
experts to neophytes, followed by the successful use of the mechanisms to generate new 
objects of value and the subsequent transmission of the skills of cultural generation to 
later generations, are characteristic of science and of other major creative cultural 
traditions of modernity.  To products of the mechanisms of generation Polanyi (1958: 
207) is apt to apply the different label of lore or heritage.  In each type of transmission, 
Polanyi suggests there are moments of passive reception and others of activity for 
students, but active imitation assumes greater importance in traditions as the processes of 
cultural generation are acquired by emulating the work of recognized craftsmen.  Polanyi 
(1958: 53) gives a greater emphasis to the role of tacit knowledge in generative traditions 
than he does in lores.  Characteristically in Polanyian traditions, method-rules, 
judgments, and creativity in problem solving are unformulated and embodied as personal 
intuitive knowledge.  
 
Polanyi’s two kinds of transmissions are related to each other in several ways.  A 
generative tradition can only be transmitted to those who have learned the corresponding 
lore of products, providing the generative tradition with its vocabulary, concepts, point of 
departure, and presuppositional worldview (Polanyi 1946: 57, 64, 83).  Learning a 
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Polanyian lore is similar to learning a language.  O’Hear writes in another context (1988: 
6) that to learn a language is ‘to learn it as a practice’ so that it ‘will initially be instilled 
in us and accepted by us on its own terms’ rather than be adopted as an ‘explicit theory 
[that] we might consider and form an opinion about.’  To learn a language is to assimilate 
the ‘values and perceptions embodied in its concepts and classifications.’  In short, an 
agent has to immerse ‘himself in the practice and interest of pre-existing culture.’  Each 
generative tradition will have to make additions to a corresponding lore of products 
otherwise agents in a generative tradition would come to reject it as sterile.  A lore of 
products will have had a genesis, although not necessarily in the form of a generative 
tradition existing through time (a lore of products might be assembled from eclectic 
sources).  But as a rule, when a lore of products is being added to, the additions will 
occur from a corresponding generative tradition.  A lore of products can endure without a 
corresponding generative tradition which may have atrophied or else, as we have just 
suggested, may never have existed.  (Oral traditions, as for example the ballads that 
Homer collected together to form his epic poems, and the navigational knowledge of 
Micronesia, are lores of products without corresponding coexisting generative traditions.  
While static, these lores are exceedingly complex, and are acquired in the course of a 
long training that fosters skillfulness to a high degree (Gladwin 1970: 220, 225).  Polanyi 
is surely correct, however, in thinking that the cultural traditions that characterize 
modernity are ‘dynamic’ ones, while oral lores exist in pre-modern societies.  Polanyian 
dynamic traditions contrast against static lores such as the world’s major religions, for 
their sacred scriptures are, as Radin notes, deposits that are entrusted to carefully selected 
guardians for preservation.  Hermeneutic activity may exist alongside scriptures, its 
agents aiming to validly interpret texts.  Possessing a certain dynamism (understandings 
of meaning alter), these hermeneutic activities may be located on a continuum between 
dynamic traditions and static lores (Connerton 1989: 95ff.).  (In several respects 
Polanyi’s idea of tradition foreshadows that of Alasdair MacIntyre, but there is a 
difference in that MacIntyre’s traditions are not peculiar to modernity, examples having 
existed throughout history, whereas dynamic traditions –dynamic traditions as against 
static lores – are, for Polanyi, a peculiar feature of modernity.) 
 
Afterword 
 
It has become a commonplace that traditions are deliberate inventions.  This view is 
expressed in the title and in the text of the Hobsbawm-Ranger anthology (Hobsbawm 
1981: 1; Connerton 1989: 51-52).  Giddens (1999: 3) claims that all traditions have been 
invented (‘consciously constructed’), implying that forethought, design and ‘reason’ have 
gone into their planning and creation and that these continue to play a part in the ongoing 
recreation of traditions.  Langlois (2001: 15829) writes that sociologists nowadays look 
on ‘tradition as an invented reference developed by societies in function of the demands 
of the present (Hobsbawm)’.  Leaving aside the question of what exactly Langlois might 
mean by describing society as an ‘inventor’, it is the case that while certain elements of a 
tradition may be invented (e.g. theologies, scientific theories), other elements may be 
chanced upon inadvertently (accidental discoveries), with others existing objectively, for 
example as side-effects or as unintended consequences (the test-implications of theories, 
the facts that are relevant to theories) (see O’Hear 1988, 134-5). 
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*I am grateful to my colleague, Dr. Ian Weeks, for referring me to several texts that have 
served to deepen my appreciation of the complexities of the subject of tradition. 
 
 
